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ABSTRACT  
Understanding of how prices and other measures of value are established and change is 
critical to modern economics. Specifically, price stickiness often observed in goods and 
labour markets leading to a sluggish adjustment process from the micro to macro level and 
competitive concerns. This study examines this phenomena through assessing the prevalence 
of pricing points or convenience pricing in the market for retail savings products. A database 
of interest rates (the price of a savings product) representative of the UK retail deposit 
account market from 1989 to 2011 is used to examine whether price stickiness is conditional 
on the direction of price change and the scale of the prevailing interest rate. Using a 100-state 
Markov chain process, we find evidence that rates tend cluster around certain endings and 
that stickiness is conditional on the direction of the price change. This finding is consistent 
with a profit maximising bank strategy. 
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Do pricing points increase interest rate rigidity? 
Introduction 
Can the process through which retail interest rates are established influence how these rates 
change? Specifically is the clustering of interest rates around certain digits, pricing points or 
convenient prices, associated with their rigidity? As the price system is the central market 
mechanism ensuring products and services are provided to those persons who value these 
goods or services the most (Levy 2007), comprehension of how prices and other measures of 
value are established and change is essential. Despite this centrality within modern 
economics the causes of price rigidity are a persistently disputed area of economic thinking 
(Wolman 2007, Blinder 1991). We address these issues by examining whether pricing points 
or convenient prices are associated with interest rate rigidity or alternatively are widely 
accepted menu cost explanations of rigidity more plausible explanations of rigidity. This 
work contributes to literature examining these issues in standard product markets (e.g. Levy 
et al 2011) both through applying a similar methodology to retail financial markets and also 
by extending these methods by considering the ‘impetus’ for price change.   
This question is examined in the context of retail banking using interest rates from a large 
proprietary dataset of retail deposit accounts. In total we examine the interest rates offered on 
2,519 UK retail deposit accounts issued between 1989 and 2011 by 113 firms. This study 
examines how these retail interest rates change using transition matrixes to investigate the 
probability of an interest rate change within a 100-state Markov chain process. We report that 
interest rates appear to most frequently change from a relatively limited set of digits to a 
similar form of digits. Specifically the use of fractions and whole numbers, associated with 
both pricing point and convenient pricing approaches are widely observed. Further change in 
interest rates is observed to be infrequent and associated with pricing point rather than menu 
costs explanations in this market.   
The implications of these findings are multifaceted. These findings contribute to a growing 
literature examining price clustering and how such practices inhibit overall market price 
changes. Second, traditional assumptions linking the swift transmission of base rate changes 
into retail interest rates are not supported since the transmission of base rate changes into 
retail interest rates is slowed by the practice of using pricing points. Lastly, these practices 
clearly act against the interests of depositors with asymmetric responses to the theoretical 
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cost of funds to the financial firm observed. Depositors are expected to accept a lower overall 
return through the sluggish adjustment to increasing market rewards compared to the more 
immediate reduction with falls in market rewards.    
Addressing whether pricing points or convenient prices are associated with interest rate 
rigidity is important for many reasons, including the prevalence of pricing at a limited set of 
digits, the importance of price rigidity within macro and micro economic contexts and for 
competition and consumer protection concerns.    
Initially, the clustering of prices, fees, and yields around a limited number of digits is 
increasingly recognized to be commonplace in financial and non-financial markets. 
Indubitably, price clustering has been observed in markets diverse as equity (e.g. 
Bessembinder 1997, Cai et al 2007, Christie and Schultz 1994, Christie et al 1994, Chung et 
al 2004, Cooney et al 2003, Niederhoffer, 1966; see Mitchell 2001 for a review), gilts (Ap 
Gwilym et al 2005), options (Ap Gwilym and Alibo 2003, Ap Gwyilym and Verousis 2013), 
IPOs (Kandel et al 2001), foreign exchange (Sopranzetti and Datar 2002, Sonnesmans 2006), 
asset markets (Grossman et al 1997), swap markets (Liu and Witte 2013, Meng et al 2013), 
the setting of tax rates (Ashworth et al 2003), house prices (Palmon et al 2004), oil markets 
(Bharati et al 2011), mergers and acquisitions (Baker et al 2012), supermarket pricing (Levy 
et al 2010) and the reporting of financial accounts (Das and Zhang 2003). Moreover, such 
clustering has also been reported to be a feature of retail banking markets in the USA and UK 
(Kahn et al 1999, Ashton and Hudson 2007). While many influential studies of pricing have 
played down the influence of pricing points and clustering on price rigidity (e.g. Blinder et al 
1998) reassessing this question in the context of this body of evidence appears timely.   
Despite the widespread presence of clustering of prices and yields around a limited number of 
digits, the implications of this practice not as well understood as commonly assumed. Most 
studies of price clustering have made worthwhile contributions by testing why certain digits 
such as fractions and round numbers occur more frequently than other digits. It has been 
reported this practice persists for reasons of convenience, to reduce negotiation and 
comprehension costs, as a function of market characteristics or as a profit maximisation 
strategy. This study does not contest these theories yet examines a further issue raised in 
recent clustering studies (e.g. Cai et al 2007, Sonnesmans 2006) of how the clustering of 
prices around certain digits is associated with price change and rigidity of pricing.  
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Secondly, determining the causes of interest change and factors which impede interest rate or 
price changes has general and specific macro-economic implications. Generally, the presence 
of price rigidity influences the construction of prices indices (Bunn and Ellis 2011) and is 
central to how Keynesian models generate predictions; (Wolman 2007). Examining retail 
interest rates specifically is also important as many systems of monetary policy focus on 
controlling money supply through interest rate targets (Biefang-Frisancho and Howells 2002, 
Bunn and Ellis 2011). For example within the UK, a traditional policy assumption is that ‘… 
banks and building societies pass on any changes in the base (rate) to their customers 
immediately’ (Heffernan 1997 p.221). Despite the significance of comprehending interest 
rate change, comprehension has long been a ‘black box’ (Dale and Haldane 1998). This study 
therefore contributes to this literature by determining whether pricing points or convenience 
pricing of interest rates are a significant factor contributing to the sluggish movement of retail 
interest rates.         
Lastly, there are competition law implications if pricing points affect the degree of pass 
through of costs to final prices and artificially raise prices (Alexandrov 2013). As retail 
banking markets are expected to operate in a competitive manner, factors which limit the 
responsiveness of interest rates to freely change to competitive levels need to be identified. 
Reflecting this concern the competitive operation of retail banking and the setting of interest 
rates has been raised in the European Union (European Commission Directorate-General for 
Competition 2006), Australia (Australian Senate 2011) and the UK (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2014; 2015a, 2015b, Independent Commission on Banking 2011). In this study we 
contribute to these literatures by examining if pricing points arising from interest rate 
clustering are a factor restricting the free movement of interest rates to the detriment of 
depositors.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the literature. The data and 
methods employed are outlined in section three. The results, including a descriptive and 
graphical analysis and transition matrices, are reported in section four. Finally in section five 
concluding remarks are provided. 
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2.  Literature review  
The price rigidity and pricing of different commodities, goods and services and incidence of 
price clustering around certain digits has been examined by many different academic 
traditions, including consumer research, finance, economics, marketing and statistics. 
Acknowledging the scope of these literatures we focus this discussion on price and interest 
rate rigidity and clustering relative to financial markets and where possible retail banking. 
Specifically we outline why interest rate rigidity and clustering could arise and indicate past 
evidence of the incidence of such phenomena in different markets.  
Since Means (1935) rigid, sticky or sluggish price change been widely observed. The 
prevalence of rigid pricing in recent years has been observed in the numerous central banking 
assessments of inflation persistence. These studies (e.g. Bunn and Ellis 2011, Gautier 2006, 
Hoffman and Kurz-Kim 2006, Kurri 2007) have involved examination of substantial micro 
data sets and report price rigidity is a substantial and heterogeneous phenomena over time 
and markets examined; concerns also supported by survey evidence (for example Hall et al 
(2000) and Blinder et al (1998) for UK and US firms respectively).  
In light of the scope of price rigidity it is unsurprising that determining the causes of sticky 
prices has both a long lineage (e..g. Means 1935) and scope of explanations
1
. Prominent 
within the literature, Blinder et al (1998) examined twelve most plausible theories explaining 
rigid prices (see Wolman 2007, for a review). From interview data Blinder et al (1998) 
reported price rigidity arises from concerns that price changes might antagonise customers 
(21%), raise competitive pressures (14%) or is due to menu costs (14%).   
Reflecting these results, subsequent discussion of price rigidity has relied on menu costs as a 
critical theoretical lynchpin (Levy 2010). It is often assumed that there are administrative and 
physical costs associated with altering prices and informing customers of a price change. 
Prices will therefore only change when the decision to undertake this action is profit 
maximising. While empirical evidence supporting menu cost explanations of price rigidity 
                                                          
1
 This literature has developed from a range of different perspectives not least of which is examining 
the veracity of different macro-economic models. For example much debate has been undertaken as to 
whether prices change in a synchronised or staggered manner between and with firms (e.g. Lach and 
Tssidon 1996, Fisher and Konieczny 2000) which is not outlined in detail as this is more pertinent to 
other debates than this. 
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are limited some evidence is supportive. For example Levy et al (2010) examined multi 
product retailing in settings where changing prices is more and less costly and confirmed the 
importance of menu cost explanations in this context 
Other explanations of rigidity have also been assessed including competition and the exercise 
of market power. Concerns with anti-competitive arrangements appear to have importance in 
explanations of price rigidity and clustering in non-financial markets including oil (Bharati et 
al 2011) or petrol (gasoline) markets (Jiménez and Perdiguero, 2012). The institutional 
structure of markets has also been reported as influential with firms with a greater sensitivity 
to costs (MacDonald and Aaronson 2006), a history of frequent price changes (Campbell and 
Eden 2005) and high firm liquidity (De Graeve et al 2004) having more responsive pricing.  
Explanations of interest rate rigidity specifically have been forwarded within an extensive 
literature examining how market or official rates of interest are transmitted to the interest 
rates paid on retail deposits and other financial services. These studies have linked the 
rigidity of interest rates with a wide array of market characteristics including yet not 
exclusively the competitiveness of retail financial services markets (Calem and Mester 1995; 
Heffernan 1997); interest rate asymmetry (De Haan and Sterken 2004), market structure, both 
in the US and Europe (Corvoisier and Groop 2001; De Graeve, De Jonge and Vander Vennet 
2004; Hannan and Berger 1991), lending channel effects (De Graeve, De Jonge and Vander 
Vennet 2004), bank efficiency (Fuertes and Heffernan 2009), macroeconomic changes 
(Gambacorta 2008), regulation (Chong 2010) and the scale of official or base rate changes 
(Fuertes, Heffernan and Kalotychou 2010) as influential factors influencing the relationship 
between official or market rates and retail interest rates.  
Price rigidity and the use of pricing points or convenience pricing arises when prices form at 
certain digits. The particular digits, around which prices form, depend on the context and 
explanations which dominate. For example, 99 is observed in many contexts if pricing point 
explanations dominate, or whole numbers or fractions may predominate when convenience 
pricing is commonly used (see Knotek 2011). Pricing points or convenience pricing has 
previously been identified in situations where menu costs are not substantial, such as internet 
book sales (Chakrabarti and Scholnick 2005), electronic markets, (Oh and Lucas 2006) and 
apartment rents (Genesove 2003), and situations where menu costs are significant such as 
catalogue sales (Kashyap 1995). Many reasons have been forwarded to explain why prices 
would cluster around certain digits rather than be randomly distributed across all digits. These 
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explanations reflect concerns that the valuation of assets and contracts is subjective and based 
on a wide range differing assumptions.  
Initially, prices may cluster around certain digits as mechanism to aid negotiation and reduce 
transaction costs. In essence prices are set in many markets to provide convenience. From a 
non-behavioural perspective, focal points (Mehta et al 1994) form to enable coordination. If 
we assumed the labelling which players use in any competitive game is critical and reflects 
common culture or experience and that the brain is a tool of prediction and estimation rather 
than a calculation device (Kopcke et al 2004), the use of certain numbers is a rational strategy 
to reduce time and effort in transactions (Basu 2006). Therefore price clustering could result 
as a convention in markets to reduce conflicts in decision making, limit negotiation costs and 
aid commerce. More widely when given a choice as to the price paid, Lynn et al (2013) 
reports a preference for round numbers over other digits reflecting the long recorded human 
tendency to associate with rounded numbers, halves, quarters and even numbers (Yule, 
1927). 
Evidence of the use of a limited number of ‘convenient’ prices has also been observed in 
many markets. In retail markets the use of convenient prices such as round numbers are seen 
frequently when rapid decision making is required (Knotek 2011). Within financial markets 
the degree and extent of price clustering around certain digits could also reflect a trade-off 
between the level of price transparency, the costs of negotiation (Harris 1991) and 
information availability (Ball et al 1985). Indeed the benefits of a very fine valuation relative 
to the loss resulting from a rounded valuation may be limited when decisions are considered 
in a sphere of haziness (Cai et al 2007) or with a degree of uncertainty. Reflecting such 
thinking, Ap Gwilym and Verousis (2013) examining the equity option values, reported the 
degree of clustering varies over time reducing with proximity to the options’ expiration date, 
when the trading volume will increases. In a similar vein, Meng et al (2013) report price 
clustering varies within credit default swaps, reducing with the size of trades and increasing 
within periods of increased volatility. Considering, the U.S dollar/Taiwan dollar swap 
market, Liu and Witte (2013) also observe more clustering arises with the scale of the market 
and activity. The characteristics of the market considered may also be significant when 
determining the degree of price clustering. These characteristics might include the industrial 
structure of individual markets (Grossman et al 1997), cultural factors (Brown et al 2002), 
the form of trading, such as the adoption of dealer or auction markets (Huang and Stoll 2001) 
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or the trading scales used for trading (Chung et al 2003, Ap Gwilym et al 2005). Clustering 
also varies with the form and format of the financial contract considered; Ap Gwilym and 
Verousis (2013) reported clustering has multi-dimensional aspects and occurs over price, 
time value and also information value components within equity options.  
Distinctly, it has also been argued clustering and the use of pricing points arises from 
behavioural factors. In particular the predictions of prospect theory and framing (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1986) where consumers react more strongly to 
losses than gains, are generally risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, and make 
choices from an initial reference point could be influential. For example, the perceived gain 
effect would indicate that a relatively high incidence of the number 9 in prices occurs as zero 
could be used as a reference point. Conversely a perceived loss from a one would be 
disproportionate suggesting this number would be avoided in pricing. Consequently prospect 
theory indicates that certain numbers, such as 9 and 4 would be over represented and other 
numbers such as 1 and 6 are under-represented in pricing (Schindler and Wiman 1989).  
Developing this rationale, Kahn et al (1999) viewed the decision-making attributes of 
depositors to be critical to this process, where retail banking markets are assumed to be 
populated by more and less informed customers which choose banking services with different 
levels of attention. In the presence of customers with varying decision making abilities banks 
will choose to cluster reported interest rates as a profit maximising strategy. Specifically the 
level of interest rate clustering is predicted to rise with the proportion of naïve or less 
informed customers.  
Overall we observe explanations for price rigidity and clustering are diverse, overlap and 
include both explanations assuming benign and profit maximising explanations. The degree 
to which these concepts are linked in practice and the presence of clustering at certain digits 
be these for convenience or pricing points, is an issues explored in the next section.  
  
3. Data, Hypothesises and Methodology  
In this section we outline the key hypothesises to be examined, the data employed and the 
methodology.  
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The testing approach and key hypothesises  
The testing approach employed draws heavily from the pricing point and menu cost models 
of pass through from Alexandrov (2013) and Kashyap (1995). Initially we assume that the 
interest rate rigidity of any firm i may be influenced by either a) pricing points or convenient 
prices or b) menu cost explanations of price rigidity. Further, firms decide to change interest 
rates or otherwise following a change in the costs of providing the deposits, be this arising 
from the prevailing policy or base interest rate, the costs of providing the deposit service or 
the demand for deposit services. We consider the change in base rates as a proxy for all such 
cost arguments. 
If pricing points or convenient prices are influential then firms’ may change interest rates to 
one of several pricing points. These points could represent convenience or pricing points 
depending on the explanation for any interest rate clustering observed. When the firm faces a 
change in costs of a given size, it can decide to change or keep the current price. It is assumed 
the optimal pricing structure is to break up possible cost changes into a continuum of 
potential cost values with a pricing point for each one. If the cost of change is within a certain 
limit or threshold then the price will remain the same. If this cost change is above this 
threshold then the price will change. Expressed differently, interest rate change can occur 
when the distance between costs and prices exceeds a certain range. The new price will be 
chosen from a limited number of possible prices and this price should share common features 
with other prices used by the firm. As we are examining deposit accounts where a price 
represents a benefit to the consumer, we would expect profit maximising pricing points to be 
consistent with convenient prices and occur at whole numbers, round numbers and fractions 
(see Ashton and Hudson 2007).   
Alternatively if menu costs are significant the firm maximises profits from an interest rate 
change only when menu costs are exceeded by profits arising from the interest rate change.   
While this results in interest rate change if costs or demands move beyond a certain expected 
range, under menu cost explanations, the new price to which the firm moves will reflect a 
profit maximising decision and the choice of pricing digits will be a random decision.  
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Therefore if pricing points are more influential than menu cost explanations we would expect 
to observe a range of features in this market including:  
a) Substantial clustering at a limited set of digits (round numbers, fractions and 
whole numbers).  
b) Movement from pricing points (round numbers, fractions and whole numbers) to 
other pricing points should be more frequent than movement to non-pricing 
points.  
To consider whether pricing point or menu cost explanations are linked to interest rate 
rigidity, we compare the relative speed of interest range change to underlying cost changes 
represented by the base rate. For the incidence of interest rate change we would expect to 
observe:  
c) Movement from pricing points (round numbers, fractions and whole numbers) to 
other pricing points is associated with slower responses to base rate changes.   
 
Data  
The data used in this analysis is obtained from the monthly MoneyFacts magazine which 
produces a representative monthly catalogue of available UK savings products and associated 
interest rates. We have compiled data from this publication for the period January 1989 to 
December 2011 involving 276 monthly periods. Deposit accounts are particularly suited for 
this form of analysis. Deposits are relatively simple and widely comprehended financial 
services which can be readily judged on price as quality is less uncertain than other financial 
services such as insurance.  Unlike loans these contracts are not established over long fixed 
periods yet vary over time.  
It should be noted that the monthly format of the dataset relates to the publication date of the 
magazine which has been obtained from a market survey in the week preceding the previous 
month end, and so a date of February relates to the market situation around the 25th of 
January. The data includes 2,519 deposit account products from 113 firms. The product age 
varies from one month to 268 months in duration with a mean of 53.58 months. Of the 2,519 
products included in the dataset the highest number of product observations being 268 
periods, most products are observed between 50 and 100 months and no product is available 
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for the entire sample period; 48 products are observed for only one period. In total there are 
1,090,854 observations and 180,727 changes in interest rates which are examined.  Rates are 
collected for a range of 9 initial deposit balances, ranging from £1 to £100,000.  
The descriptive analysis uses interest rates from all tiers, across all products, and across all 
types of financial institution. In the assessment interest rates are quoted up to two decimal 
places, and so are somewhat discrete in nature much like goods prices. Although an explicit 
rule does not exist, all rates in the UK are quoted to this level of precision, with no currently 
marketed product using a higher or lower degree of precision.  
To represent costs we examine base rates issued by the Bank of England. UK deposit taking 
institutions generally adjust their interest rate tariff as a result of change in the Bank of 
England base rate, which may be interpreted as a proxy a wholesale cost of funds rate. Over 
the sample period the Bank of England Base Rate has undergone 26 changes, declining from 
a high of 15% at the beginning of our sample, to a low of 0.5% at the end.  
 
 
Methodology 
The inferential element of the testing procedure considers the how interest rates change from 
one number to another. It is assumed within this assessment that clustering in some way 
influences the likelihood and magnitude of an interest rate change be this generally or in 
cases where we might expect an interest rate change to occur after a change in the base or 
policy rate.   
The framework for this testing procedure assumes each deposit account can be thought of as 
having an initial ‘state’ determined by the two digit decimal ending to the rate. In this case 
there are 100 possible initial states which we denote ,  , , … …, 
 to .  
The migrations of interest rate endings from one state (ending) to another are assumed to 
follow a Markov process. We acknowledge this requires independence with both previous 
states and with time. To analyse the dynamics of switching from one state (ending) to 
another, a 100-state Markov chain probability transition matrix for the last two digits of the 
1 '00'S  2 '01'S  3 '02'S 
99 '98'S  100 '99'S 
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interest rate for the probability  of switching from state  in the first period to state  in 
the second (Hanson and Schuermann 2006) is estimated. The time between  and , which 
is denoted t , is generally taken to be one month, though in some cases we also examine 
switching these transition probabilities over a two or three month window. 
The counterpart of these transition probabilities are transition ‘intensities’ which can be 
calculated as summarised by: 
  (1) 
where  denotes the sample probability of interest rate ending changes from state  to 
, namely an entry of the estimated transition probability matrix.  is a count of 
interest rate ending migrations from state  to  for product n at tier k.  
Thus, we can obtain a matrix of migration intensities, the sample counterpart of the Markov 
chain probability transition matrix, denoted . The main diagonal of this transition 
probability matrix represents probabilities for accounts which change by a full percentage 
point (upward or downward), since the matrix is conditional on a change in the rate occurring 
between states, while off-diagonal elements are for a change in ending, regardless of the level 
of change in the integer component of the rate. 
To fully compare interest rate ending migration dynamics with a degree of statistical 
significance, a simple point estimate is not enough. Therefore, bootstrapped confidence 
intervals for these transition probabilities are constructed by resampling (with replacement) 
the deposit interest rates to produce 1,000 replications of  (Efron 1993). This bootstrapping 
method assumes serial product-wise independence of the interest rates. 
In the following analysis we first examine price change without reference to base rates and 
then considerer the reaction of accounts following a base rate change stimulus. We again 
employ the transition matrix, this time only for the specific period of 3 months following a 
particular base rate movement. 6 base rate changes are identified based on the magnitude of 
the change in both the first month, and subsequent two months. The periods chosen are 
shown by the vertical bars in Figure 1a (for comparison Figure 1b shows the changes in the base 
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rate over time), and cover a range of positive and negative moves of differing magnitude in 
the base (policy) rate. Each of these periods commences on a base rate change month: (23
rd
) 
November 1993, (12
th
) September 1994, (4
th
) June 1998, (13
th
) January 2000, (5
th
) April 2001 
and (5
th
) August 2005.  
 
Figure 1a: Base Rate Changes and Cumulative Year Bank of England Base Rate 
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Figure 1b: Changes in the Bank of England Base Rate over Time
 
Note that change isn’t necessarily cumulative – an account will be treated as having a 
positive change in the first month if its rate increases by say 0.25% in this month, yet if this is 
later corrected by a 0.25% reduction in the rate, the account overall will be deemed not to 
have changed (at either the two month, or three month horizon) hence the proportion and so 
probability of change might actually fall at longer horizons.  
As a ‘control’ we also examine the movement of rates in a period where there are no Base 
Rate change impetus, which is shown in the subsequent tables as 0, 0, 0. The data for this is 
from March 2002. The results will suggest that rate change probability in such periods is very 
small, with less than 5% of account rates changing. As such, we would seem justified in our 
assumption that changes in the base rate, a proxy for the cost of funds, is the predominant 
incentive for firms to alter their interest rate tariffs. 
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This assessment is undertaken for a range of situations reflecting hypotheses b) and c). 
Addressing hypothesis b) that movement from pricing points (round numbers, fractions and 
whole numbers) to other pricing points should be more rather than less frequent we examine:    
1)  the probability of move to a certain value is conditional on another value for all 
moves and moves upwards and downwards (reported in Table 2) 
2) the move from a popular ending is conditional on a change in the interest rate 
(reported in Table 3).  
When addressing hypothesis c) that movement from pricing points (round numbers, fractions 
and whole numbers) to other pricing points should be associated with slower responses to 
base rate changes, we examine:    
1)  the probability of a rate change conditional on a change in the base rate (reported in 
Table 4).  
2)  The size of an interest rate change conditional on a change in the base rate (reported 
in Table 5).  
3)  the probability of move from a popular versus an unpopular ending subject to a 
change for 3 different deposit quantities (reported in Table 6) 
4)  the size of a move subject to a popular and a non-popular ending for three deposit 
quantities (reported in Table 7).   
 
4. Results  
4 .1   Descriptive Analysis  
We first consider the case where the final digit is clustered around a particular number and 
how this level of clustering has evolved over time. In Figure 2 it is shown that there is a 
tendency for rates to cluster around a 0 or 5 ending, with these two endings accounting for 
over 90% of the sample across all time periods. There is less clustering around 4 and 9 
endings.  
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Figure 2: Final Digit Clustering 
 
Turning to an examination of the clustering evident in the final two digits a much clearer 
pattern develops as shown in Figure 3. Around 28 per cent of rates are clustered at the 
integer, that is a 00 ending, which is around 18 per cent more of the sample than any other 
two-digit clustered ending. The next most popular ending is 50, at around 10 per cent of the 
sample, followed by 25 and then 75.  
Clustering at other endings is limited to less than 5 per cent of observations, with the majority 
of such rates being at a decile and so having a final ending digit of a 0, so affirming the 
strong tendency for 0 ending final digit. We may therefore report interest rates are set at a 
limited number of points consistent with pricing points being influential.  
Looking at the predominant two digit ending through time, namely 00, 25, 50 and 75, it is 
evident from Figure 4 that the overall degree of clustering has declined through time most 
markedly in integer clustering.  
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Figure 3: Two Digit Clustering 
 
Figure 4: Level of Clustering Around a 00, 25, 50 and 75 Digit Ending over Time 
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Table 1: Top 25 Transition Probabilities Conditional on a Change  
 All Moves  Upward Moves  Downward Moves 
  Current 
Ending 
Next 
Ending 
% 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Current 
Ending 
Next 
Ending 
% 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Current 
Ending 
Next 
Ending 
% 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Rank Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
1 00 75 2.64 2.45 2.81  00 25 2.07 1.88 2.25  00 75 2.49 2.31 2.67 
2 00 25 2.56 2.35 2.74  50 75 2.06 1.87 2.24  50 25 2.31 2.12 2.48 
3 25 00 2.46 2.27 2.63  75 00 2.01 1.84 2.20  25 00 2.24 2.06 2.42 
4 50 25 2.43 2.26 2.60  25 50 1.92 1.75 2.10  75 50 2.19 2.00 2.39 
5 00 50 2.43 2.24 2.62  40 65 0.52 0.44 0.59  00 50 2.03 1.86 2.21 
6 50 75 2.41 2.21 2.60  65 90 0.50 0.43 0.57  50 00 1.84 1.68 2.00 
7 75 00 2.41 2.22 2.60  90 15 0.46 0.39 0.53  75 25 1.18 1.07 1.30 
8 75 50 2.33 2.15 2.50  15 40 0.46 0.39 0.52  25 75 1.12 1.01 1.23 
9 50 00 2.28 2.10 2.46  50 00 0.44 0.37 0.51  00 00 0.72 0.61 0.84 
10 25 50 2.27 2.07 2.45  20 45 0.43 0.36 0.49  90 65 0.55 0.48 0.62 
11 75 25 1.43 1.30 1.55  45 70 0.42 0.35 0.48  40 15 0.52 0.46 0.59 
12 25 75 1.36 1.23 1.49  95 20 0.41 0.35 0.48  65 40 0.51 0.45 0.57 
13 00 00 0.83 0.70 0.96  70 95 0.40 0.34 0.47  15 90 0.50 0.43 0.57 
14 40 65 0.57 0.49 0.65  00 50 0.40 0.34 0.46  00 25 0.49 0.42 0.58 
15 90 65 0.56 0.49 0.63  60 85 0.39 0.34 0.45  50 50 0.46 0.38 0.55 
16 40 15 0.55 0.49 0.61  00 20 0.36 0.31 0.42  05 80 0.43 0.37 0.50 
17 15 90 0.53 0.46 0.60  50 70 0.35 0.30 0.41  70 45 0.42 0.36 0.48 
18 65 40 0.52 0.46 0.59  80 05 0.34 0.28 0.39  95 70 0.41 0.36 0.48 
19 65 90 0.52 0.45 0.60  35 60 0.34 0.28 0.39  75 00 0.40 0.34 0.47 
20 50 50 0.52 0.44 0.61  05 30 0.33 0.27 0.39  85 60 0.40 0.35 0.46 
21 15 40 0.51 0.44 0.58  30 55 0.32 0.27 0.38  60 35 0.40 0.35 0.45 
22 90 15 0.48 0.41 0.55  55 80 0.31 0.25 0.36  45 20 0.39 0.34 0.45 
23 00 20 0.47 0.40 0.53  80 00 0.30 0.25 0.34  30 05 0.39 0.33 0.45 
24 20 45 0.46 0.40 0.53  25 45 0.29 0.24 0.34  20 95 0.38 0.33 0.43 
25 95 20 0.45 0.38 0.52  75 95 0.27 0.22 0.32  50 75 0.36 0.30 0.41 
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Table 2: Probability of a Move from a Popular Ending Conditional on a Change 
  1 Month  
  All Moves  Moves Up  Moves Down 
  % 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 % 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 % 
95% Confidence Interval 
  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
00 20.96 20.28 21.68  7.24 6.88 7.61  13.72 13.15 14.29 
25 19.67 18.82 20.53  7.75 7.31 8.18  11.92 11.30 12.55 
50 20.22 19.35 21.10  7.38 6.94 7.84  12.84 12.25 13.43 
75 22.57 21.74 23.43   8.62 8.14 9.11   13.95 13.34 14.61 
            
  2 Months 
00 37.26 36.12 38.47  13.34 12.69 13.99  23.92 23.00 24.85 
25 34.98 33.50 36.44  14.16 13.46 14.95  20.82 19.80 21.86 
50 35.21 33.75 36.62  13.21 12.50 13.97  22.00 21.04 22.99 
75 39.81 38.42 41.22   15.63 14.83 16.48   24.18 23.11 25.23 
            
  3 Months 
00 48.99 47.50 50.49  17.85 16.98 18.69  31.14 30.01 32.31 
25 46.20 44.34 48.13  19.09 18.06 20.17  27.10 25.75 28.50 
50 46.47 44.66 48.29  17.82 16.85 18.78  28.65 27.37 29.95 
75 52.49 50.69 54.21   20.96 19.89 22.02   31.53 30.27 32.93 
 
 
4.2 Results of the transition matrixes.  
Table 1 shows the top 25 transitions in terms of their probability. The left-most panel shows 
the transitions for all moves, while the middle and right-most panel show these probabilities 
conditional on the move being upward or downward, respectively. 
The most common transition in both the directional and non-directional panels is from a 00 
ending. Downward moves from this category appear to account for the overall dominance of 
the 00 to 75 ending change probability at around 2.5% of all moves, with the 00 to 25 upward 
move probability of nearly 2% making this the second most frequent move within the class of 
all moves. It is clear that changes from popular endings to other popular endings dominate 
moves from non-popular endings by a factor of 4, further confirming the clustering of rates 
identified in the previous descriptive analysis. 
Table 2 shows that given a rate ending in 75, there is a 22.57% chance that this rate will 
change in 1 month, 39.81% in two months, and a 52.49% probability that it will have 
changed over a 3 month interval. These are the largest probabilities in the table suggesting 
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that a move from a 75 ending is more likely compared with 00, 25 and 50 ending rates. The 
confidence interval also supports the finding that the probability of a move is statistically 
significantly larger in the main for the 75 ending rates compared with nearly all other 
endings. Generally it is the 25 rate which is least likely of the popular ending rates to change. 
Comparing moves up with moves down, probabilities of a move from a popular ending are 
between 1.5 and 2 times larger for moves down compared with up. This might be an artefact 
of the overall downward trend in base rates over the sample period, but is also consistent with 
a profit-maximising motive on the part of the firm. This will be examined in more detail 
shortly, when we look at the likelihood of a move given a directional change impetus to the 
cost of funds. Finally, comparing the different time intervals for all rate endings, around 1 in 
5 products move in any one month, but over a 3 month interval, around 1 in 2 will have 
changed rates, suggesting rates are not terribly persistent. This is defensible since the 
economic cost of changing rates are relatively low compared to say, a supermarket, as menu 
costs consist primarily of interest rate publications. 
Table 3: Average Size of a Move from Popular Endings Conditional on a Change 
  1 Month 
  All Moves  Moves Up  Moves Down 
  Size 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Size 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Size 
95% Confidence Interval 
  Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
00 0.50 0.48 0.51  0.40 0.37 0.42  0.55 0.53 0.56 
25 0.45 0.43 0.47  0.39 0.36 0.42  0.49 0.47 0.51 
50 0.47 0.46 0.49  0.37 0.35 0.40  0.53 0.51 0.55 
75 0.45 0.43 0.46   0.38 0.36 0.41   0.49 0.47 0.50 
            
  2 Months 
00 0.55 0.53 0.57  0.42 0.40 0.45  0.62 0.60 0.64 
25 0.49 0.48 0.51  0.41 0.39 0.44  0.55 0.53 0.57 
50 0.52 0.51 0.54  0.39 0.37 0.42  0.60 0.58 0.62 
75 0.49 0.48 0.51   0.40 0.38 0.42   0.55 0.53 0.57 
            
  3 Months 
00 0.62 0.60 0.64  0.46 0.44 0.49  0.70 0.68 0.73 
25 0.56 0.54 0.58  0.45 0.42 0.48  0.63 0.61 0.65 
50 0.58 0.56 0.60  0.43 0.41 0.45  0.68 0.65 0.70 
75 0.55 0.53 0.57   0.43 0.41 0.46   0.63 0.60 0.65 
 
Table 3 shows the average size of a move from the popular endings. Although base rate 
moments are generally of 0.25%, the size of the change in retail interest rates is closer to 
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0.5%. Movements in base rates therefore have to pass a certain level in order to trigger an 
interest rate change.  
Conversely from the probability of move shown in Table 2, it is 00 ending rates which 
generally appear to move by the largest amount, while 75 ending rates move by the smallest 
amount. Similar to the previous analysis, however, we find that moves down are of generally 
great magnitude, and that over longer horizons, there is a larger overall change in rates than at 
shorter horizons. 
Table 4: Probability of a Rate Change given a Particular Change in the Base Rate 
  
Base Rate Change Rate Ending 
1 month  2 Months 3 Months 
  Up Down Up Down Up Down 
2005 -0.25, 0, 0 
Popular 1.37 79.66 1.65 92.54 2.35 92.46 
Non-Popular 2.28 75.77 2.79 92.25 3.43 91.98 
1998 +0.25, 0, 0 
Popular 32.52 0.00 52.47 0.07 59.96 2.88 
Non-Popular 36.36 0.51 62.56 1.09 78.27 2.59 
1994 +0.5, 0, 0 
Popular 24.45 1.26 60.84 0.60 77.30 0.61 
Non-Popular 21.25 1.06 60.61 2.06 80.55 2.84 
1993 -0.5, 0, 0 
Popular 1.31 29.48 2.05 80.45 2.06 86.65 
Non-Popular 0.34 30.01 0.00 84.29 0.80 94.95 
2000 +0.25, +0.25, 0 
Popular 55.39 2.00 80.53 2.23 86.36 2.06 
Non-Popular 57.79 2.73 86.92 2.84 91.52 3.55 
2001 -0.25, -0.25, 0 
Popular 0.13 73.71 0.66 92.92 0.66 94.17 
Non-Popular 0.09 70.94 1.12 94.87 1.07 95.96 
2002 0, 0, 0 
Popular 1.01 0.72 1.31 1.97 0.77 3.22 
Non-Popular 0.40 1.56 1.12 3.48 1.61 4.91 
 
The second column in Table 4 shows the shock dynamics over three months for which the 
transition probabilities are described. As an example, a -0.25, 0, 0 entry in this column 
signifies a Base Rate reduction of 0.25% in the first month followed by no further changes in 
the Base Rate over the next two months. Likewise a +0.25, +0.25, 0 entry signifies two 
consecutive months where the Base Rate increases by 0.25% followed in the third month by 
no further change. Although the dynamics are analysed in one particular period, as shown by 
the year in the first column, it is assumed these dynamics are typical of all such shock 
situations. Change probabilities are split according to whether the original rate ending was 
00, 25, 50 or 75 which we call ‘popular’ while other endings are referred to as ‘non-popular’. 
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It should be noted that the November 1993 fall in the base rate by 0.5% is unusual in that the 
rate change announcement came towards the end of the month, on the 23
rd
, while the latest 
point for all other changes within the month is the 13
th
. Accordingly, the speed of adjustment 
appears overly slow, only because of publication lags and/or the fact other changes have over 
one and a half months for the change to be reflected in the interest tariffs, while this particular 
change only has just over a month. Further reassurance that the Base Rate acts as the main 
incentive for change is evidenced by the size of the directional probabilities: in all cases 
probabilities are significantly larger for change in the same direction as the change in the 
Base Rate.  
The table provides some key insights in to the speed of reaction given both size and direction 
of a Base Rate change. Examining first the single change dynamics shown in the first 4 rows 
of the table it is clear to see that the probability of a change is generally much larger in earlier 
months when the rate is being reduced compared to when it is being increased. Over the full 3 
months cumulatively, there is a larger overall probability of change (around 90%) for rate 
decreases compared with rate increases (80%). Given an increased incentive to change rates 
following consecutive changes in the Base Rate, the same observation that there is a lower 
incentive to move rates up compared with down is evident.  
There isn’t strong evidence in this table for consistently higher change probabilities if the rate 
is currently on at a non-popular ending, though there is some limited support for changes over 
longer-horizons. This finding is consistent with a profit maximising firm seeking to delay 
passing on costly rate increases to customers but immediately passing on cost saving 
reductions. Thus, in summary, there is significant asymmetry by firms in their reaction to 
Base Rate changes.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the size of probable moves for the various Base Rate 
events described above. Again these are not cumulative, with further correction within the 3-
month horizon examined leading to a reduction in probability from one month to the next. 
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Table 5: Size of Rate Change given a Particular Change in the Base Rate 
  Base Rate 
Change 
  
1 month  2 Months 3 Months 
  Up Down Up Down Up Down 
2005 -0.25, 0, 0 
Popular 0.37 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.43 0.30 
Non-Popular 0.39 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.41 0.30 
1998 +0.25, 0, 0 
Popular 0.30 NaN 0.31 0.25 0.34 0.41 
Non-Popular 0.25 0.42 0.26 0.90 0.28 0.55 
1994 +0.5, 0, 0 
Popular 0.47 0.41 0.38 0.66 0.37 0.66 
Non-Popular 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.66 0.29 0.74 
1993 -0.5, 0, 0 
Popular 0.74 0.48 0.80 0.52 0.80 0.55 
Non-Popular 0.08 0.29 NaN 0.49 0.10 0.48 
2000 +0.25, +0.25, 0 
Popular 0.26 0.45 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.35 
Non-Popular 0.21 0.51 0.35 0.65 0.39 0.72 
2001 -0.25, -0.25, 0 
Popular 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.45 
Non-Popular 0.28 0.31 1.66 0.49 1.73 0.50 
 
Error! Reference source not found. and   
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Table 7 are similar to Table 2 and Table 3 but instead of looking at the dynamics across 3 
time horizons, instead consider a 1 month window restricted by the initial deposit balance. 
This will allow for the rate dynamics at the different interest rate tiers (a small, medium and 
large initial investment) to be examined and compared. The other difference from the 
previous tables is that in addition to tabulating moves from the 4 most popular endings, 00, 
25, 50 and 75, we also group the moves in to those from popular and non-popular endings, 
and all moves, regardless of the initial ending state. 
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Table 6: Probability of a Move for Popular versus Non-Popular Endings for 3 Initial 
Deposit Balances 
  £500 
 All Moves  Moves Up  Moves Down 
 
% 
95% Confidence 
Interval  % 
95% Confidence 
Interval  % 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Popular 20.38 19.76 21.01  7.28 6.91 7.67  13.10 12.58 13.63 
Non-Popular 19.63 19.09 20.17  7.83 7.51 8.14  11.80 11.36 12.22 
Total 40.01      15.11      24.90     
00 20.29 19.22 21.37  6.48 5.96 7.01  13.81 12.93 14.68 
25 19.74 18.51 21.13  7.94 7.25 8.72  11.80 10.79 12.78 
50 19.20 18.03 20.39  6.76 6.17 7.37  12.45 11.60 13.33 
75 22.88 21.59 24.24   8.48 7.71 9.30   14.41 13.39 15.48 
            
  £5,000 
Popular 21.08 20.55 21.60  7.87 7.56 8.18  13.22 12.82 13.62 
Non-Popular 20.99 20.53 21.44  8.27 8.00 8.56  12.72 12.37 13.06 
Total 42.07      16.14      25.93     
00 21.66 20.76 22.58  7.55 7.11 8.05  14.11 13.42 14.85 
25 20.13 19.07 21.19  7.98 7.43 8.57  12.15 11.42 12.95 
50 20.56 19.53 21.55  7.53 7.00 8.06  13.03 12.30 13.78 
75 22.03 21.09 23.05   8.60 8.00 9.22   13.42 12.69 14.20 
            
  £50,000 
Popular 21.47 20.94 22.02  7.95 7.64 8.25  13.52 13.08 13.95 
Non-Popular 21.51 21.02 22.00  8.47 8.18 8.77  13.04 12.70 13.39 
Total 42.98      16.42      26.56     
00 21.84 20.89 22.81  7.52 7.06 7.95  14.32 13.60 15.03 
25 19.67 18.60 20.81  7.85 7.30 8.41  11.82 11.14 12.56 
50 21.44 20.38 22.56  7.81 7.16 8.58  13.63 12.88 14.40 
75 23.07 22.01 24.18   8.85 8.27 9.46   14.22 13.42 15.14 
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Table 7: Size of a Move for Popular versus Non-Popular Endings for 3 Initial Deposit 
Balances 
  £500 
 All Moves  Moves Up  Moves Down 
 
Size 
95% Confidence 
Interval  Size 
95% Confidence 
Interval  Size 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Lower Upper  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Popular 0.49 0.47 0.51  0.42 0.39 0.44  0.53 0.51 0.55 
Non-Popular 0.44 0.43 0.46  0.35 0.33 0.37  0.51 0.49 0.52 
                      
00 0.51 0.48 0.53  0.42 0.38 0.46  0.55 0.52 0.58 
25 0.48 0.45 0.51  0.45 0.39 0.51  0.50 0.47 0.53 
50 0.49 0.46 0.52  0.40 0.35 0.46  0.54 0.51 0.57 
75 0.47 0.44 0.49   0.40 0.35 0.45   0.51 0.48 0.53 
            
  £5,000 
Popular 0.47 0.46 0.48  0.39 0.37 0.41  0.52 0.51 0.53 
Non-Popular 0.43 0.42 0.44  0.34 0.32 0.35  0.49 0.48 0.50 
                      
00 0.49 0.47 0.51  0.38 0.35 0.41  0.55 0.53 0.57 
25 0.45 0.43 0.47  0.37 0.34 0.40  0.50 0.48 0.53 
50 0.48 0.46 0.50  0.40 0.37 0.43  0.53 0.51 0.55 
75 0.46 0.44 0.48   0.41 0.37 0.45   0.49 0.47 0.51 
            
  £50,000 
Popular 0.47 0.46 0.49  0.40 0.38 0.42  0.52 0.50 0.53 
Non-Popular 0.43 0.42 0.44  0.33 0.31 0.34  0.49 0.48 0.50 
                      
00 0.50 0.48 0.52  0.42 0.38 0.45  0.55 0.53 0.57 
25 0.46 0.44 0.49  0.43 0.39 0.47  0.49 0.47 0.51 
50 0.47 0.45 0.48  0.36 0.34 0.39  0.52 0.50 0.55 
75 0.45 0.43 0.47   0.40 0.36 0.44   0.48 0.46 0.51 
 
All panels in Table 6 and likewise, all panels in Table 7 show a remarkably similar picture for 
the interest rate change dynamics. Further investigation, not reported here to converse space, 
shows a similar picture for other tiers of investment balances. It can therefore be concluded 
that the likelihood of change, and the size of change, is independent of the initial deposit 
balance, and so Table 2 and Table 3 provide a fair approximation of the dynamic process.   
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5.    Conclusions   
In this study we examine whether pricing points or convenient prices are associated with 
interest rate rigidity or alternatively whether more established and widely accepted menu cost 
explanations of rigidity appear more plausible as an explanation of rigidity. This question is 
examined in the context of retail banking using interest rates from a large proprietary dataset 
of retail deposit accounts. We report the interest rates appear to most frequently change from 
a relatively limited set of digits to similar form of digits. In particular we observe the use of 
fractions and whole numbers, associated with both pricing point and convenient pricing 
approaches having strong influences on interest rate setting in the market. Further change in 
interest rates is observed to be infrequent and associated with pricing point explanations 
rather than menu costs explanations in this market.    
This is important to consider as how prices and interest rates form is central to many 
assumption of moderns economics. In micro economics much debate has focused on market 
efficiency and how well markets price certain assets; in macro economics the emphasis has 
been placed on how much nominal prices fail to adjust to changes in market conditions. This 
said, while pass through of prices has been used as a theoretical concept throughout 
economics (Alexandrov 2013) empirical evidence on this issue is still emergent.  Moreover 
determining whether interest rates change infrequently and why this can occur is a question 
of significance for comprehending monetary policy more generally (Wolman 2007).   
The implications of these findings are multifaceted. We suggest such findings contribute to 
growing literatures examining clustering and indicate the incidence of such practices may 
have in reducing pricing change. Second, current assumptions indicating the swift 
transmission of base rate changes into retail interest rates are slowed by the practices of using 
pricing points. 
 The operation and price setting in all financial markets and particularly banking has a direct 
influence on the operation and application of monetary policy. Reflecting this concern there 
has been a substantial literature examining the association between bank interest rates and the 
costs of funds. This literature assesses how bank interest rate setting is influenced by changes 
in the policy or base rate or the wholesale cost of funds, indicating how such monetary policy 
actions can eventually influence the supply of deposits. If the formation of prices or yields 
around certain digits has implications as to how prices may then change and respond to 
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external factors, such as a changing policy or base rate then the past assumptions as to the 
transmission of monetary policy decisions may need to be revised.  
Lastly, these practices are clearly acting against the interest of depositors with asymmetric 
responses to cost changes observed and depositors receiving lower levels of return as a result 
of this property. The reduction in clustering at these popular endings by around 20 per cent 
since 1989 could possibly be linked with the UK savings market becoming increasingly 
competitive. Financial institutions to effectively compete may have neededto attract 
financially savvy individuals, who will have good recall of rates and so demand rates which 
more accurately match with the costs of obtaining these funds faced by the financial 
institution. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, consumers are becoming more financially 
aware and so the proportion of naïve customers has declined, and so financial institutions 
cannot exploit limited customer recall to the extent they once were able to do. 
The observation of reducing clustering over time is also congruent with the finding of Kahn 
et al (1999) that the cost of funding is positively correlated with the level of clustering. The 
Bank of England base rate, the rate at which banks can borrow from the central bank, has had 
a general downward trajectory over the sample period. As such, following the reasoning of 
Kahn et al (1999) this reduction in the wholesale borrowing rate would suggest a reduction in 
clustering, which is indeed what we observe. What is perhaps surprising is that since 2009, 
when base rates hit 0.5%, there has actually been a small increase in the overall degree of 
clustering at 00, 25, 50 and 75 endings. 
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